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Abstract—The exposure of location data constitutes a signifi-
cant privacy risk to users as it can lead to de-anonymization, the
inference of sensitive information, and even physical threats. In
this paper we present LPAuditor, a tool that conducts a compre-
hensive evaluation of the privacy loss caused by publicly available
location metadata. First, we demonstrate how our system can
pinpoint users’ key locations at an unprecedented granularity
by identifying their actual postal addresses. Our experimental
evaluation on Twitter data highlights the effectiveness of our
techniques which outperform prior approaches by 18.9%-91.6%
for homes and 8.7%-21.8% for workplaces. Next we present a
novel exploration of automated private information inference that
uncovers “sensitive” locations that users have visited (pertaining
to health, religion, and sex/nightlife). We find that location
metadata can provide additional context to tweets and thus lead
to the exposure of private information that might not match the
users’ intentions.
We further explore the mismatch between user actions and
information exposure and find that older versions of the official
Twitter apps follow a privacy-invasive policy of including precise
GPS coordinates in the metadata of tweets that users have
geotagged at a coarse-grained level (e.g., city). The implications
of this exposure are further exacerbated by our finding that users
are considerably privacy-cautious in regards to exposing precise
location data. When users can explicitly select what location data
is published, there is a 94.6% reduction in tweets with GPS
coordinates. As part of current efforts to give users more control
over their data, LPAuditor can be adopted by major services
and offered as an auditing tool that informs users about sensitive
information they (indirectly) expose through location metadata.
I. INTRODUCTION
The capability of modern smartphones to provide fine-
grained location information in real time has enabled the
deployment of a wide range of novel functionality by online
services. In Twitter users can incorporate location information
in their tweets to provide more context and enrich their
communications [52], or even enhance situational awareness
during critical events [77]. Nonetheless, the presence of loca-
tion metadata in a by-default-public data stream like Twitter
constitutes a significant privacy risk. Apart from potentially
enabling physical threats like stalking [31], [57] and “cyber-
casing” [27], location information could lead to the inference
of very sensitive data [51], [13], and even get combined with
other information collected from online services [58]. Previous
work has demonstrated how to identify users’ key locations
(i.e., home and work) at a postcode [22] or very coarse-grained
(∼10,000m2) level [35], [16]. However, this coarse granularity
fails to highlight the true extent of the privacy risks introduced
by the public availability of geographical information in users’
tweets. Furthermore, these studies have not explored what
sensitive information can be inferred from users geotagging
tweets at other locations.
In this paper we develop LPAuditor, a system that examines
the privacy risks users face due to publicly accessible loca-
tion information, and conduct a large scale study leveraging
Twitter data and public APIs. Initially we present techniques
for identifying a user’s home and work at a postal address
granularity; our heuristics are built around intuitive social
and behavioral norms. We first conduct a two-level clustering
process for creating clusters of tweets and mapping them to
postal addresses, which is robust to errors in the GPS readings
of smartphones [79] as well as minor spatial displacement
due to user mobility (e.g., the user tweeting while arriving or
departing from home). Subsequently we analyze the spatio-
temporal characteristics of a user’s tweets and break down
the user’s tweeting behavior in time windows of varying
granularity; we identify the most long-lived clusters in regards
to weekend tweeting activity, and then select the one with the
largest number of one-hour time windows that contain at least
one tweet. For identifying users’ workplaces, we introduce
the first adaptive technique that handles users with varying
or split shift schedules at work. Specifically, we identify the
longest clusters in terms of active weeks. Then, we extract the
dominant time frame of each cluster by superimposing their
daily time frames, even ones spanning two different days (i.e.
night shifts), and excluding any hours that appear to be outliers,
as well as any clusters that have a repeated activity of more
than 10 hours and, finally, select the cluster with the largest
number of active weeks.
Through an arduous manual process we create a ground
truth dataset for 2,047 users, which enables us to experimen-
tally evaluate our auditing tool. Our system is able to identify
the home and workplace for 92.5% and 55.6% of the users
respectively. When compared to state-of-the-art results, we find
that our techniques outperform previous approaches by 18.9%-
91.6% for homes and 8.7%-21.8% for workplaces.
Apart from the increased effectiveness of our techniques,
our work demonstrates that by leveraging widely available ge-
olocation databases attackers can pinpoint users’ key locations
at a granularity that is orders of magnitude more precise than
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
00
89
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  3
 Ja
n 2
01
9
previously demonstrated. Without doubt, this level of accuracy
renders the identification of users a trivial task. The privacy
implications of our findings are even more alarming when
considering the prominent role that platforms like Twitter play
in protests and other forms of social activism [36]. Indeed, a
substantial number of users choose to not reveal their actual
identity on Twitter, and prior work has found a correlation
between the choice of anonymity and the sensitivity of topics
in tweets [54]1 and other online posts [53].
LPAuditor offers a comprehensive analysis of the privacy
loss caused by location metadata by also exploring whether the
remaining locations can be used to infer personal information
that is typically considered sensitive. While the inference of
sensitive information has been one of the main motivations
behind prior research on location-privacy [61], such automated
attacks have not been demonstrated in practice. Our system
examines tweets that place the user at (or in close proximity of)
locations that are associated with such information. Currently
we search for locations pertaining to three sensitive topics:
religion, medical issues, and sex/nightlife. We find that 71%
of users have tweeted from sensitive locations, 27.5% of
which can be placed there with high confidence based on the
content of their tweets. Privacy loss is amplified by the location
metadata as it leaks additional contextual details to the tweet’s
content; e.g., the user may simply mention being at a doctor
without giving more details, while the location metadata places
the user at an abortion clinic. We also explore a spatiotemporal-
based approach and find that 29.5% of the users can be placed
at a sensitive location regardless of the content of their tweets.
As such, we envision LPAuditor being offered as an auditing
tool by social networks and location-based services, providing
users with an overview of the sensitive information that can be
inferred based on their publicly accessible location data. This
can support recently stated initiatives of giving users more
control over their data [3].
Finally, our study reveals that older versions of the Twitter
app implement a privacy-invasive policy. Specifically, tweets
that are geotagged by users at a coarse level (e.g., city)
include the user’s exact coordinates in the tweets’ metadata.
This privacy violation is invisible to users, as the GPS co-
ordinates are only contained in the metadata returned by the
API and not visible through the Twitter website or app. To
make matters worse, this historical metadata currently remains
publicly accessible through the API. We quantify the impact
of Twitter’s invasive policy, and find that it results in an almost
15-fold increase in the number of users whose key locations are
successfully identified by our system. In an effort to remediate
this significant privacy threat we have disclosed our findings
to Twitter. In summary, our main research contributions are:
• We conduct a comprehensive, IRB-approved, large-scale
exploration of the privacy risks that users face when
location data is, either explicitly or inadvertently, shared
in a public data stream like Twitter’s API.
• We develop LPAuditor, a system that leverages location
metadata for identifying key locations with high preci-
sion, outperforming state-of-the-art approaches. Apart from
achieving superior granularity, we also introduce a cluster-
1This study also reported that 5.9% of Twitter accounts are anonymous and
another 20% do not disclose their full name.
ing approach that renders our system robust to errors in
GPS readings or spatial displacement due to user mobility.
• We present the first, to our knowledge, study on the fea-
sibility of automated location-based inference attacks. Our
system leverages novel content-based and spatiotemporal
techniques for inferring sensitive user information, thus,
validating the motivation of prior location-privacy research.
• We measure the impact of Twitter’s invasive policy for
collecting and sharing precise location data and quantify
the lingering implications. Our study on user geotagging
behavior reveals that users are restrained when publishing
their location and avoid including exact coordinates when
given control by the underlying system, yet remain exposed
due to the availability of this historical data.
II. MOTIVATION AND THREAT MODEL
The sensitive nature of mobility data is well known to the
research community, which has proposed various techniques so
far for limiting the granularity of the location data that services
can obtain (e.g., [32]). In practice, however, such defenses have
not seen wide deployment and a large number of mobile apps
collect precise locations [64]. While prior work has proposed
approaches for identifying key locations (home and work),
the reported granularity is not sufficient for demonstrating the
true extent of the threat (e.g., [22], [35], [16], [17]). More
importantly, the risk of sensitive information being inferred
from other location data points remains unexplored.
Despite the privacy risk this data poses to users, services do
not stringently prohibit access to it and may expose it to third
parties [41] or render it publicly accessible. To demonstrate
the extent and accuracy of sensitive information inference that
an adversary can achieve, we develop and evaluate LPAuditor
exclusively using public and free data streams and APIs. Fur-
thermore, we design our system to be application-independent
and applicable to other location datasets. We show that location
metadata enables the inference of sensitive information that
could be misused for a wide range of scenarios (e.g., from
a repressive regime de-anonymizing an activist’s account to
an insurance company inferring a customer’s health issues, or
a potential employer conducting a background check). While
we build a tool that can be adopted by online services for
better protecting users’ privacy, the techniques employed by
our system could be applied by a wide range of adversaries or
invasive third parties. By demonstrating the severity and practi-
cality of such attacks, we aim to initiate a public discussion and
incentivize the adoption of privacy-preserving mechanisms.
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section we provide an overview of our system. First
we describe how LPAuditor clusters location data and identifies
key locations. Next we provide details on our methodology
for identifying sensitive locations that users may have visited.
Finally, we provide some implementation details.
A. Data Labeling and Clustering
Labeling tweets. The first step is to label each geotagged
tweet with the corresponding postal address. To highlight the
extent of the risk that users face, we opt for publicly available
API services that could be trivially employed by attackers for
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mapping each tweet’s GPS coordinates to an address. To that
end, we use the reverse geocoding API by ArcGIS [10] for the
majority of our labels, and the more accurate but rate-limited
Google Maps Geocoding API [30] for the subset of labels
that are more critical to our accuracy. While this allows us to
improve our system’s performance, in practice, if LPAuditor
is adopted by a major service like Twitter, Google Maps could
be used for the entirety of the calls.
Since our dataset is large in size, we developed a form of
caching that allows avoiding unnecessary API calls. Instead of
issuing a call for every pair of coordinates we come across,
we estimate the spatial position of the pair of coordinates and
search for nearby coordinates that have already been labeled.
If the distance to a labeled pair of coordinates is less than
two meters, we assign the same address label to the new pair
of coordinates. Experimentally, we found that this approach
reduced the number of API calls our system issued by 42.5%.
It should be noted, however, that geocoding APIs do not
always return an address. We label those tweets with “unknown
address”. After a manual investigation and verification of a
random subset, we observed that they typically correspond to
places like university campuses, airports or remote rural areas
that do not have exact postal addresses. Nonetheless, while we
don’t have a postal address in these cases, the granularity of
our process is unaffected as we still have the GPS coordinates.
Initial clustering. LPAuditor groups tweets assigned to the
same postal address into a single cluster (we refer to this as
first-level clustering). Then, by taking into consideration the
coordinates of all the tweets of a cluster, we calculate the
coordinates for the cluster’s mid-point (geometric center). To
verify that the label assigned to a cluster indeed corresponds to
the cluster’s actual address, we use the Google Maps API for
retrieving the address of the cluster’s mid-point coordinates.
If the address returned from Google’s API does not match
the already assigned address label for the cluster, due to
incompatibilities between the two APIs or borderline cases
where our caching approach results in assigning a neighboring
address, we opt for the address returned from Google’s API.
However, due to Google’s stricter API rate limits, we only use
this methodology for verifying the address of the 10 largest
clusters of each user, which we have empirically found to
be the most prominent and significant ones. This follows our
threat model constraint of demonstrating what attacks can be
conducted using free and public APIs. In practice, attackers
with many resources could avoid rate limiting or use other
proprietary geolocating databases.
For tweets with the “unknown address” label we employ
the DBSCAN algorithm [23]. We empirically set our threshold
to 30 meters, but due to its cascading effect we may cluster
together points that have a greater distance due to other points
laying in between them. We only use DBSCAN for clustering
tweets that have been marked with “unknown address” (∼16%
of clusters); nearby tweets that have been labeled with an
actual address are not considered by DBSCAN.
Second-level clustering. We have observed that the initial
clustering approach can result in multiple neighboring clusters
for a specific place. The most common case involves one large
dominant cluster in the area and a few significantly smaller
clusters next to it, in close proximity. In general, it is difficult
Fig. 1: Example of our second-level clustering.
to distinguish which tweets belong to each cluster, even by
plotting the coordinates of these tweets on a map and visually
inspecting them. Through an empirical analysis, where we
visually inspected clusters and cross referenced the timing of
their tweets, it became apparent that these closely neighboring
clusters typically correspond to a single user location but have
been mapped to a neighboring address. Various factors can lead
to this, such as inaccuracies in the user’s GPS readings [79],
the precision of the geocoding APIs, as well as differences in
the actual tweeting position of the user (tweeting when leaving
a place or arriving, being in the backyard or at a neighbor etc.).
As these nearby clusters most likely correspond to the same
place, we implement a second-level clustering for grouping
such neighboring clusters into a larger one.2 First we identify
which cluster in an area of multiple neighboring clusters is
dominant, i.e., has the most tweets, and then we employ a mod-
ified version of the DBSCAN algorithm for estimating which
clusters should be merged with the dominant one. For this
clustering we consider that the distance between the mid-point
of the larger central cluster and all the smaller ones should not
exceed 50 meters.3 To eliminate DBSCAN’s cascading effect
we check this distance before deciding whether a cluster should
be included in the new one. An example is shown in Figure 1,
where there are several clusters of significant size, with smaller
clusters around them. All tweets in a cluster are depicted with
a common color, and the dark green pins denote the center
of the various clusters, with the size of each cluster pin being
dependent on the number of tweets mapped to it.
Overall, implementing our second-level of clustering al-
lows us to introduce a (configurable) radius for effectively
mapping these “runaway” data points to the main cluster.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the initial clustering
step (using the geocoding API) is actually necessary; solely
applying DBSCAN’s radius-based clustering to the dataset
leads to oversized clusters and eliminates the finer granularity
that is achieved by the two-level clustering approach.
B. Identifying Key User Locations
Here we describe how LPAuditor selects the clusters that
represent two key user locations (home and workplace) in an
2For the remainder of the paper, referring to clusters will imply second-level
clusters unless stated otherwise.
3We set this threshold based on the value in the FCC mandate for 911
caller location accuracy [25], as it can account for GPS errors but is not
prohibitively large so as to lead to false positives. We also experimentally
verified its suitability.
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automated fashion. Our system does not take into consideration
the content and semantics of the tweets posted, but only the
temporal characteristics and distribution of the tweets in each
cluster. It should be emphasized that our work focuses on
location metadata and not the tweet content as this allows us
to quantify the true extent of the privacy risks introduced by
location metadata: even cautious users that do not explicitly
disclose information about their key locations face this privacy
loss. However, LPAuditor leverages the content for increasing
confidence in placing users in other sensitive locations, as dis-
cussed in Section III-C. It is imperative to note that our system
incorporates heuristics that are built upon intuitive assumptions
regarding common human behavior and legislative norms (e.g.,
8-hour shifts) in the US (location of our study’s users) and
many other countries as well (e.g., in the European Union).
While highly effective, these heuristics may require tweaking
for countries with vastly different social norms or legislature;
such cases are out of the scope of this work.
First we obtain the local timezone corresponding to each
cluster from its mid-point coordinates, and then convert the
timestamp of each tweet to the local time. This allows us to
identify tweets that have been posted within specific hours,
and understand the user’s daily routine and behavior in depth.
For capturing the temporal characteristics of each cluster and
understanding the user’s activity and tweeting patterns, our
system identifies active time windows, i.e., time windows with
at least one geotagged tweet for a particular cluster. Apart from
days or weeks, time windows can be set to represent weekdays,
weekends, or even specific time frames at a granularity of
hours (e.g., afternoon, late night).
Homes exhibit distinct characteristics compared to other
places users regularly visit, as that is where people typically
return at the end of the day and also spend a considerable
amount of time. Due to the non-ephemeral relationship people
have with their home, the temporal characteristics of a user’s
tweeting behavior can sufficiently distinguish this location
from other visited locations. One exception could be users
that are considerably privacy-cautious and refrain from posting
geotagged tweets from their home or surrounding areas.
Our approach for identifying a user’s home cluster is based
on the following intuitions: (i) as the user spends some time at
home every day, we expect to repeatedly observe some activity
from this cluster (i.e., multiple active windows in this cluster’s
timespan), and (ii) the tweets of this cluster will not occur
solely within a specific time frame, but we expect tweets that
correspond to almost all hours in the day. In other words, while
other clusters of a user may follow a specific well-defined
temporal pattern, we expect the home cluster to exhibit a more
“chaotic” behavior in the long term, having tweets that were
posted at different times throughout the day, from early in the
morning to very late at night.
While experimenting with two approaches for specifying
the time windows (i.e., only weekends vs entire weeks), we
observed that a week-based time window may introduce uncer-
tainty for users that exhibit considerable activity from multiple
clusters. As such, we design a robust home-inferring algorithm
by only considering weekends. We determine which are the
user’s five most active clusters “horizontally”, i.e., those with
the highest number of active weekends, and estimate the time
frame and active hours of each of these clusters. Following our
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Fig. 2: An example diagram representing the tweeting activity
of two users in our dataset from their home and work clusters.
User1 exhibits a more “traditional” activity pattern, while
User2 exhibits erratic patterns with different work-shifts.
intuition that the home will exhibit more widespread temporal
activity from a macroscopic viewpoint, we choose the cluster
with the broadest time frame as the user’s home.
Work. We expect that, for most users, tweets posted from
work will follow a well-defined time frame that corresponds
to the user’s working hours. We set the time window to the
entire week and identify the five most active clusters, i.e., those
with the highest number of active weeks (in the horizontal
dimension). We ignore the home cluster when assembling this
set. For each of the remaining candidate clusters we try to
identify the cluster’s most dominant time frame. To that end,
we identify all the distinct days in which the user has posted
more than one tweet, and use the day’s earliest and latest tweet
for calculating the time frame of that day. After estimating the
time frame of each active day, we superimpose all these time
frames and consider as the dominant time frame the set of
hours that appears in more than half of the active days of the
cluster. This allows us to avoid including insignificant hours,
e.g., for days where the user happened to go to work a little
earlier or later than usual. At the same time this also allows us
to handle users that have a more lax schedule or may work in
shifts. We also account for users that work night shifts, which
span two consecutive dates; specifically, we consider instances
of active time windows that span two days, have a duration of
up to eight hours [5] and terminate by 07:00,4 and are followed
by a period of inactivity of at least eight hours.5
Next, we exclude all tweets not belonging to the dominant
time frame. We also exclude clusters that repeatedly have daily
activity of more than ten hours, as they most likely do not
correspond to the user’s work (since we assume that most
jobs have eight-hour shifts). However, as sometimes people
are required to work overtime, or stay at work longer than
4In the United States the night shift is typically 23:00-07:00 while the
European Union identifies it as including the 00:00-05:00 period [2].
5The US Department of Labor considers that a normal shift is followed
by “at least an eight-hour rest” [5] while the European Union’s 2003/88/EC
directive establishes a “minimum rest period of 11 consecutive hours.”
4
usual, we are flexible and only exclude clusters with more
than 20% of their daily time frames exceeding the ten-hour
threshold (i.e., one workday per week) based on reported
average overtime hours in the US [1] and the European Union’s
limit for 48 hours per week. Finally, we select the cluster with
the largest number of active weeks as the user’s workplace.
It is important to note that our approach provides the first
adaptive approach that dynamically identifies shifts or common
working hours for each individual user, contrarily to previous
approaches that followed a simplistic approach of considering
fixed working hours for all users (e.g., “09:00-17:00”).
An example of the tweeting activity of two users from
both home and work is given in Figure 2. Both users’ locations
were correctly identified by LPAuditor. For the top user, tweets
from work fall in a well-defined time frame (08:00-16:00), in
contrast to tweets posted from home, which cover almost all
times of day. The bottom user exhibits a more erratic behavior
with different work shifts within a week, highlighting the need
for our dynamic approach that adapts to different patterns.
C. Identifying Highly-Sensitive Places
While identification of a user’s home and workplace is
a significant privacy risk, our goal is to also explore the
feasibility of uncovering personal user information that may be
considered even more sensitive. As such, we want to identify
other places a user has visited that could be used to infer
such sensitive information. LPAuditor identifies a user’s Poten-
tially Sensitive Clusters (PSCs) which are in close proximity
to highly-sensitive venues, and determines whether the user
actually visited these venues. To label a cluster as potentially
sensitive, we estimate the cluster’s mid-point coordinates and
use Foursquare’s [26] venue API for retrieving information
about the nearest venues.
We consider venues that are within a 25 meter radius from
the cluster’s mid-point coordinates; we set a more restrictive
threshold compared to the key location clustering process to
avoid potential false positives due to the small number of
tweets per cluster and density of PSCs. In practice, if LPAu-
ditor is offered as an auditing tool to users, these thresholds
can be user-configurable to allow for flexibility for areas of
different venue density (e.g., downtown metropolitan areas vs
rural areas). The Foursquare API returns the name of each
venue as well as its type, selected from an extensive list of
predefined categories. As such, we have identified which of
the venues returned by the API are associated with sensitive
categories or subcategories (the categories we consider as
sensitive in this study can be seen in Figure 9).
Content-based corroboration. Proximity to a sensitive
venue does not necessitate that the user visited it (at least
on that occasion). It could quite possibly be a case of simply
passing by or visiting a different (potentially non-sensitive)
nearby venue. To determine if the user is associated with
the sensitive venue, we analyze the content of the cluster’s
tweets in an effort to capture terms that indicate the user’s
presence at that venue. It is important to note that despite the
user including some relevant keyword in the tweet, location
metadata allows attackers to obtain more context and infer
sensitive information that the user did not intend to disclose.
LPAuditor uses three manually-curated wordlists of related
terms based on numerous online domain-specific corpora that
contain keywords related to our sensitive categories. Specifi-
cally, our wordlists contain medical- and health-related terms,
terms associated with various religions, and sex/nightlife. We
remove relevant keywords that are overtly ambiguous in con-
text, as they can lead to false positives (e.g., “joint” may refer
to a part of the body, some type of establishment, or may be
drug-related). Our wordlists are available online.6 These lists
can be easily modified, or expanded to include terms from
other categories (e.g., political).
LPAuditor first pre-processes users’ tweets (i.e., tokeniza-
tion, lemmatization, removes punctuation, emojis, mentions,
stop-words and URLs) using the NLTK library. Then it uses
term frequency - inverse document frequency (tf-idf) to
identify the most significant terms within the tweets of each
PSC. For each cluster we consider the cluster’s tweets as
the document and the entirety of the user’s tweets as the
collection (with each cluster considered a document). As
tf-idf assigns a score to the terms of the cluster, we check
the three terms with the highest score against the respective
wordlist, to determine if the context of these terms can be
associated with a nearby sensitive venue.
Duration-based corroboration. Due to the sensitive na-
ture of these venues, users will not always include content in
their tweets that enables us to place them in a sensitive venue.
For this reason, we introduce another approach that does not
depend on the content of tweets, but on the repetitiveness and
duration of user visits to a specific geographic area, in order to
identify places the user has likely visited. More specifically,
with this approach we identify PSCs that have consecutive
tweets in the span of a few hours, which indicate that the user
has spent a considerable amount of time at that place. In order
to avoid cases where the users did not visit a sensitive place but
posted multiple tweets while passing by it, we exclude cases
of consecutive tweets that have been posted in short periods of
time (within five minutes). We also identify tweets posted from
the same cluster on different days, which shows that the user
tends to repeatedly visit that place. Obviously this approach
does not work for clusters with a single tweet, and it lacks the
additional confidence in placing the user at the sensitive venue
that we obtain with the content-based approach. Nonetheless,
it highlights a significant source of privacy leakage.
D. Implementation Details
LPAuditor has been designed as a completely modular
framework, allowing for each individual component to be
trivially changed or extended (e.g., incorporating a new data
source, or implementing a different clustering method etc.).
Our system has been fully implemented in Python, and all
collected data is stored into a Mongo database. In more detail,
we leverage the Tweepy package for interacting with Twitter’s
API and collecting users’ timelines. For the first-level cluster-
ing and address validation we rely on the Geopy package
(via which we interact with the ArcGIS and Google APIs),
while our second-level clustering is based on the default imple-
mentation of DBSCAN as provided by the scikit-learn
package. For collecting venue information LPAuditor uses the
6https://www.cs.uic.edu/∼location-inference/
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Foursquare package, while the NLTK package is used for
all tweet preprocessing and procedures related to tf-idf. Given
the importance of scalability when processing large collections
of users, we have designed LPAuditor to be able to use multiple
API keys in parallel. This allows us to speed up the more
inefficient parts of the process which rely on communicating
with external, and often rate-limited, APIs. Finally, as each
user is processed completely independently from other users at
all stages, multiple instances of our framework can be executed
in parallel for increasing efficiency.
IV. DATA COLLECTION
We first describe our automatically-collected Twitter
datasets, and then outline our methodology for manually creat-
ing a ground truth dataset used for the experimental evaluation
of LPAuditor in Section V.
Datasets. We used Twitter’s streaming API for collecting
a set of tweets within a bounding box that covers the mainland
area of the United States. While LPAuditor can be applied to
any country with similar working norms (e.g., shift duration)
we opted for users in the US as our sensitive location inference
also requires the tweet content and we currently only support
English. Furthermore, it is also the one country common across
the datasets of all the prior studies we compare to in Section V.
Nonetheless, an interesting future direction is to explore these
privacy risks for users in other countries.
An initial set of tweets was collected in November 2016,
through which we obtained 308,593 unique user identifiers
(UIDs). Then we collected each user’s profile information and
timeline (the 3,200 most recent tweets, according to Twitter’s
policy). This dataset contains 456,856,444 tweets, which have
been generated from 15,094 distinct sources (including unof-
ficial Twitter client apps and websites.)
Apps may handle geolocation data differently as Twitter’s
Geo Guidelines [76] are neither mandatory nor enforceable. To
avoid inconsistencies, we only consider official Twitter apps
and Foursquare in this study, which also account for the vast
majority of collected tweets. After this filtering, we end up
with 290,162 users and 345,643,445 tweets. We break down
our dataset in Table I; users who posted tweets from multiple
apps are counted in all the respective categories. Figure 3 (left)
shows the number of tweets in each user’s timeline. We find
that only ∼0.5% of the users have more than 3000 tweets, and
less than 0.06% reached Twitter’s API limit of 3,200.
As we are interested in the privacy implications that stem
from geolocation metadata, we identify all users with at
least one tweet containing GPS coordinates in the metadata.
We identified 87,114 such users, which have contributed
15,263,317 geotagged tweets in total. In Figure 3 (right) we
present the number of users’ geotagged tweets. Surprisingly
we find that for 30.03% of the users the Twitter API reveals
some precise geolocation information, with 8.01% of the users
having less than 10 geotagged tweets. We also observe that
15.55% of the users have between 10 and 250 geotagged
tweets, and approximately 5% and 2% of the users have more
than 330 and 655 geotagged tweets, respectively.
Users with many geotagged tweets may have patterns that
differ from those of users with a significantly lower number.
TABLE I: Breakdown of tweets’ sources in our dataset.
Application (source) Geoloc. Users Tweets
Twitter for Android 3 99,979 50,188,992
Twitter for iOS 3 328,320 291,820,742
Twitter for Web 7 253,616 39,655,850
Foursquare 3 13,192 3,633,711
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Fig. 3: Total number of tweets per user (left), and the number
of tweets per user that are geotagged (right).
For this reason we conduct our analysis on two different sets of
users. The first set (Top-6K) consists of the top 6,010 users in
our dataset that have the most geotagged tweets (approximately
top 2% of users in Figure 3), while the second set (Low-10K)
consists of 9,841 randomly selected users that have between
10 and 250 geotagged tweets. We use these two sets of users
for our main analysis (instead of all collected users), due to the
rate limits imposed by the API providers that we use for our
clustering process. Also, by including users with as few as 10
geotagged tweets, we can explore the privacy risk that users
face even when very few location data points are available.
Geotag accuracy. It is important to note that while other
types of location-based services may add some form of noise
or obfuscate the user’s location [57], that is not the case with
Twitter. As such, the GPS coordinates contained in the tweet
metadata we obtain through the API match those provided by
the user’s device.
Ground truth collection. As we aim to demonstrate the
true extent of this privacy issue by identifying key locations
at a postal address granularity, a significant challenge is
obtaining the ground truth for evaluating the accuracy of
our approach. While our home/work identification algorithms
focus on spatio-temporal characteristics, creating the ground
truth mandates an analysis of the tweets’ content. Due to
strict requirements for veracity, we did not resort to an
automated process but opted for an arduous and painstaking
manual process that required over 6 weeks of continuous
effort. While we have explicitly limited our data collection to
publicly available data offered by the official Twitter API, we
took extra precautions during our manual data analysis phase
for protecting users’ privacy. Specifically, the user’s account
information (name, username) was not included in the content
that was manually inspected, and references to other users (i.e.,
tokens starting with “@”) were removed as well.
In a nutshell, we started with users that explicitly men-
tioned in their tweets that they are at home, by matching
phrases such as “Im home”, “I’m home”, “at home” etc.
After identifying users with clusters containing such tweets, we
6
manually reviewed all the tweets in these particular clusters.
During the manual inspection we took into account the context
of a user’s tweets for ensuring that these clusters indeed
correspond to a user’s home. Instead of identifying work
clusters for other users, we decided to focus this task on the
users for which we have already identified their home location,
as that would allow us to create a more complete dataset that
contains both home and work locations for each user. To that
end, we followed a similar approach and searched for phrases
denoting work-related information, “at work”, “at the office”,
“my job”, “this job” etc., and manually inspected the tweets
of the returned clusters.
Below we outline the workflow of our manual inspection
process for identifying users’ home and work locations. Our
goal was to establish a methodology that allows us to have
high confidence in the resulting labels. The content analysis
and location labeling was performed by two researchers inde-
pendently; in cases where the labels by the two researchers
did not match the user was discarded. We avoided potentially
ambiguous instances or cases with uncertainty, and built our
ground truth with users where both labellers agreed. We dis-
carded such instances as we set a strict requirement for correct
labels for our ground truth. However, discarding users was a
rare occurrence, as it is a fairly straightforward and intuitive
process for human annotators to identify home/work locations.
In more detail, we established the following workflow:
1) Apart from inspecting the tweets that contained one of the
initial seed phrases, we also inspected all of the cluster’s
remaining tweets. This allowed us to further increase our
confidence by identifying tweets where the user explicitly
or implicitly referred to being at home or work (e.g., “just
took a shower”, “my boss just said” etc.). If we only found
implicit references, we required at least two such tweets
to increase our confidence.
2) To make our ground truth as complete as possible, we
also manually inspected all the tweets in users’ 10 largest
clusters, for identifying cases where users have multiple
homes or work clusters that were not already identified
during the previous task. Again we followed the same
approach as described in the previous step. In cases where
there were no other clusters with tweets indicating a
home or work location we were confident of our original
labeling, since there was only one cluster matching each
label. In cases where other clusters’ alluded to a potential
key location, we continued with the following process:
a) Temporal analysis. We explicitly analyzed the timeline
of clusters, and identified the periods during which each
cluster was active. This helped us identify cases where
users had changed residences, where multiple locations
had been labeled as homes but their active periods
did not overlap temporally. We also observed cases
where the identified home was not the user’s place of
residence, but could be considered a secondary home
(i.e., country/summer house, parents’ house). During
this step we also searched specifically for references
that allowed us to label the cluster as a secondary home
location (e.g., terms referring to parents).
b) Spatial analysis. In cases where more than one cluster
exhibited home-like patterns and had overlapping active
periods, we considered the spatial location of each clus-
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Fig. 4: Number of clusters per user.
ter. If the two clusters were close geographically, we
further investigated them to decide which one was the
user’s actual home and which was not (e.g., a friend’s
house that the user visits frequently). For clusters that
were far away from each other (e.g., in different cities),
we relied on the content for verification. A common
occurrence was clusters with home-related keywords
that exhibited continuous activity for a few days: e.g.,
users tweeting that they were at home, while visiting
their parents’ house during the holidays.
Overall, in the Home-Top dataset we have 1,004 users with
1,307 home clusters; 718 of these users have only one home
cluster, while 269 and 17 users have two and three homes,
respectively. This is not a surprising finding, as we collected
all the tweets in each user’s timeline (up to 3,200), and not
only tweets posted in a specific time period. Indicatively, we
have observed cases of users that have relocated (e.g., after
graduating), college students living in dorm rooms during
their first year and then moving to a house, and students
that regularly visit their family home. We also observed users
with multiple home locations in the Home-Low ground truth
dataset, but to a lower extent. Specifically, we identified 905
users that have one home cluster, 137 users with two, and one
user with three home clusters. For the two work ground truth
datasets, i.e., Work-Top and Work-Low, we identified 298 and
92 users, that have 363 and 98 work clusters respectively.
It is possible that our home/work ground truth datasets
are not exhaustive (i.e., we may have missed certain loca-
tions). However, due to the systematic and stringent manual
inspection process, we are certain that all the locations labeled
in our ground truth indeed correspond to users’ home and
work locations. Our manual inspection process has resulted
in ground truth datasets significantly more complete and fine-
grained than those used in prior studies [22], [35], [16], [17],
[46] (more details can be found in Section VII).
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we first present an analysis of our datasets
and discuss properties of users’ behavior regarding key and
sensitive locations. Subsequently, we use our ground truth to
experimentally evaluate LPAuditor and compare to prior work.
Location clusters. To investigate the location patterns in
users’ tweeting behavior, we focus our analysis on understand-
ing the characteristics of users’ location clusters. We perform
this analysis for both the most active (Top-6K) and less active
(Low-10K) users. Figure 4 depicts the number of clusters per
7
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user. As expected, highly active users tend to have a large
number of clusters. Specifically, only 4.45% of these users
have less than 40 location clusters, and around 28% less than
100 clusters. In more detail, we observe that around 50% of
the highly active users have more than 140 clusters, and about
25% and 10% of them have more than 200 and 280 clusters
respectively. If we only consider clusters that have more than
five tweets, we observe that about 50% of the users have more
than 11 such clusters, and 10% have more than 22 clusters.
When focusing our analysis on the Low-10K dataset, we
observe that these users have significantly less clusters than
the highly active users but seem to follow a similar pattern.
As shown in Figure 4 (right), about 10.7% have five or less
clusters, and about 50%, 25% and 10% of the users have
more than 21, 40 and 63 clusters respectively. Furthermore,
similarly to the highly active users, the number of clusters
drops significantly when considering only those clusters that
have more than 5 tweets. For both sets of users we find that
users tend to have a large number of clusters, out of which the
majority has a small number of tweets.
Figure 5 presents the percentage of users’ tweets in their
five largest clusters. We observe that for about 40% of the
users, more than half of their tweets belong to their top cluster,
while 47.77% of the users have more than 70% of their tweets
in their top 5 clusters. This phenomenon is observed in both
sets of users. In Figure 6 we explore the cluster sizes of all
users. Both datasets exhibit a power law distribution, with the
vast majority of clusters having only a few tweets and a small
number of clusters with a large number of tweets. These small
clusters will most likely not correspond to a user’s home and
work locations, as they appear to be visited rarely; however,
these locations are important from a privacy perspective, as
they allow an adversary to reconstruct a semantically-rich
location history, which can reveal highly sensitive information.
In fact, this is clearly demonstrated in Figure 7, which presents
the distribution of PSCs with regards to the number of their
tweets. We find that 67.10% of the PSCs in our datasets have
one tweet, while only 4.04% of them have 10 or more (the
most being health-related).
A. Home and Work Location Inference
To assess our methodology and measure the effectiveness
of LPAuditor we aim to pinpoint exact locations. Thus, we opt
for a “strict” evaluation of accuracy where a location is either
correctly or incorrectly identified. We do not calculate distance
TABLE II: Performance of home/work inference for ground
truth users, and ranks of the respective clusters.
Inferred
clusters
Rank of clusters
Dataset Users Precis. 1 2 3 4 5-10
Home-Top 1004 926 92.2% 806 111 8 1 -
Home-Low 1043 969 92.9% 911 49 8 - 1
Work-Top 298 164 55% 7 79 47 16 15
Work-Low 92 53 57.6% 4 31 11 6 1
errors as they are more suitable for coarse-grained approaches
that roughly estimate locations.
LPAuditor correctly identifies the home of 926 and 969
users from the two datasets, resulting in a precision of 92.23%
and 92.9% respectively. Thus apart from obtaining superior
granularity, our system is considerably more effective than
previous approaches as we will show. As our work inference
first excludes the home cluster, the outcome also depends on
the precision of the home inference. Our precision is 55.03%
and 57.6% for identifying workplaces in our ground truth. As
users typically tweet less when they are at work than when
they are at home (in our ground truth, home clusters contain an
average of 45% of tweets while work clusters contain 8%) our
effectiveness at identifying work is lower since other locations
frequented by the user can exhibit similar characteristics (e.g.,
restaurants, coffee shops, gyms). Table II presents the precision
of our home and work inference, as well as the rank of all the
correctly identified clusters. The clusters’ ranks are estimated
according to their size, such that rank 1 is the largest cluster
of the user, rank 2 is the second largest cluster and so on.
Also, we do not re-calculate cluster ranks after excluding home
clusters in the work identification phase, as we want to make
direct comparisons between the results of the two approaches.
Finally home clusters have, on average, a maximum radius of
59.55 meters and work clusters of 53.38, which drops to 19.25
meters for all clusters in our ground truth.
Having established the precision of LPAuditor on our
ground truth datasets, we run our system on the main datasets
(Top-6K, Low-10K) after excluding the ground truth users. As
can be seen in Figure 8, the majority of home clusters in both
datasets are rank 1 clusters, which is consistent with the results
from the home ground truth. For the work clusters, only 3.26%
and 7.69% are rank 1, while most of them are rank 2 and a
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considerable number occupy lower ranks, in both datasets. We
find that the detected clusters follow a similar rank distribution
in the two datasets, supporting the representativeness of our
ground truth. It should be noted though that while our work
ground truth explicitly contains users for which we have
identified their work, for the main datasets our system also
identifies locations that are not work in the strictest sense.
Specifically, we are able to identify locations for users that do
not work but have a location that can be considered a work
“substitute”, e.g., a college student attending classes.
Selection bias. The methodology that we employed to
create our ground truth datasets could potentially result in
selection bias, as it relies on certain key phrases as a starting
point for the manual process. To examine whether the accuracy
of our evaluation is a byproduct of LPAuditor’s heuristics
being “overfitted” to the ground truth, we manually examine
a random subset of users identified from the main datasets
(Top-6K, Low-10K). Specifically, we select 100 users and
manually investigate their tweets to verify whether the home
and work labels assigned by our system are correct. Following
the manual methodology described in Section III we are able
to verify that 89 of the home labels indeed correspond to the
user’s actual home cluster. For the remaining 11 users we are
unable to characterize the label as correct or incorrect based
on the users’ tweets. For the work labels, we find that for 45
users the work cluster has been correctly identified while for
30 users the label is incorrect. For the remaining 25 users we
are not able to verify whether the label is correct or not.
While this manually verified sample is relatively small, we
find that the resulting accuracy is comparable to the accuracy
achieved by our system when evaluated against the ground
truth. Furthermore, these users are from our main datasets,
which exhibit a wide range of geotagging behavior, demon-
strating that our effectiveness is not tied to a specific dataset.
As LPAuditor’s underlying algorithms are based on common
user behaviors and legislative/societal norms, we believe that
this manual verification further validates the generalisability of
our techniques and the correctness of our ground truth.
De-anonymization. While demonstrating the feasibility of
de-anonymizing Twitter users is not the focus of our work, we
conduct a small exploratory experiment. We aim to identify
which, if any, users in our ground truth datasets appear to be
pseudonymous. Specifically we want to identify users that do
not provide their full name, i.e., do not provide their last name
(we do not consider first names to be conclusive for identity).
We use the list provided by the US Census Bureau with the
most frequent surnames to filter out users that include their
last name in the full name section of their account.
After filtering 282 users remain, which we manually ex-
amine and exclude the ones that actually disclose a last name
that is not included in the Census list, or include their last
name in their username. We end up with 183 users that do not
explicitly reveal their identity on their Twitter accounts, which
constitutes a lower bound of the pseudonymous users in our
ground truth, due to potential false positives in our automated
filtering. Out of these users, LPAuditor was able to correctly
identify the home location of 171 users and the workplace of
23 users (to ensure privacy, the manual inspection of users’
names was conducted in “isolation” and not combined with
or mapped to any ground truth locations or other location
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(ground truth users have been excluded).
clusters). While these users might not be truly pseudonymous
in reality (e.g., users with a pseudonym whose actual identity
is well known within certain communities) or could also be
de-anonymized through other techniques [28], this experiment
highlights another potential threat posed by location metadata.
Prior work. Apart from pinpointing locations with a gran-
ularity that is orders of magnitude more fine-grained than prior
work, it is important to also quantify the accuracy improve-
ments of our techniques. We implement the heuristics proposed
in prior work for identifying home and work locations that
leverage spatiotemporal patterns and apply them to our ground
truth; we do not compare to techniques that require other types
of data, like social ties [38], [37], as we do not collect such
data and those techniques are inherently very coarse-grained.
By running these heuristics on the same data, we are able to
conduct a direct comparison to previous techniques and avoid
the inaccuracy of simply comparing to their reported numbers.
It is important to note that we map tweets to postal addresses
before applying these previously-proposed heuristics, i.e., we
only apply our initial first-level clustering so as to remain as
faithful as possible to their original design.
As Table III shows, LPAuditor outperforms all heuristics
proposed in prior work for both home and work locations. The
simplistic approach of selecting the largest cluster as the home
(1) performs surprisingly well, and even outperforms some of
the other more complex heuristics. We also extended this logic
and evaluated the precision of considering the second largest
cluster as the workplace (14); this results in a precision of
18.45% and 22.82% in the Work-Top and Work-Low datasets
respectively. Heuristics (4) and (8) perform better than other
prior heuristics. The approaches proposed in [46] rely on
weights obtained from their data; to remain faithful to their
design, we replicate their approach and randomly select 22%
of our users as the sample dataset to calculate the weights and
the rest as the evaluation dataset. The significant difference
between their reported accuracy and our findings can be
attributed to their experiments being conducted on a dataset
from a very limited time frame and geographic area.
Overall, our techniques present an improvement of 18.9%-
91.6% when inferring homes and 8.7%-21.8% for workplaces.
An interesting observation is that in multiple cases LPAuditor
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TABLE III: Comparison between the precision achieved by LPAuditor and previously proposed approaches. We have implemented
all prior heuristics and applied them to our ground truth datasets to allow a direct comparison.
Heuristic Description Dataset Proposed byTop Low
Home
1 Cluster with the highest number of tweets 72.3% 67.8% [16], [17], [35], [42]
2 Most tweets between 20:00-8:00 72.1% 66.4% [48]
3 Most tweets between 24:00-7:00 69.3% 54.7% [35]
4 Last destination of the day (before 3am) 73.3% 64.8% [35], [42]
5 Last destination of the day (w/o days with tweets between 24:00-7:00) 71.4% 64.4% [35]
6 Weighted PageRank for destinations 44.1% 26.4% [35]
7 Weighted PageRank for origins 37.5% 20.9% [35]
8 Most popular cluster in terms of unique days, during the Rest(2:00-7:59) and Leisure (19:00-01:59) time frames 73.1% 64.9% [22]
9 WMFV (best reported time frame: 24:00-5:59) 65% 50.9% [46]
10 W-MEAN (best reported time frame: 24:00-5:59) 0.6% 14.7% [46]
11 W-MEDIAN (best reported time frame: 23:00-5:59) 15.6% 24.5% [46]
12 LPAuditor’s Home detection without 2nd level clustering 73.7% 69.3% this paper
13 LPAuditor’s Home detection 92.2% 92.9% this paper
Work
14 Most popular cluster in terms of unique days, during the Active timeframe (e.g., working hours, 08:00-18:59) 33.2% 48.9% [22]
15 Cluster with the second highest number of tweets 18.5% 22.8% -
16 LPAuditor’s Work detection without 2nd level clustering 32.2% 30.4% this paper
17 LPAuditor’s Work detection 55% 57.6% this paper
presents a larger improvement over prior approaches for users
that are not prolific geotaggers (i.e., from the Low datasets),
indicating the benefit of our techniques when there is sparser
availability of data.
In an effort to accurately quantify the effect of our second-
level clustering on our techniques, we also run our heurstics
by applying only the first-level clustering and compare them
to prior work. LPAuditor’s home inference still outperforms
all previous approaches, both in the Home-Top and Home-
Low datasets, with an improvement of 0.4%-73.1%. On the
contrary, heuristic (14) outperforms LPAuditor’s work infer-
ence in both Work-Top and Work-Low datasets, by 1% and
18.5% respectively. These differences in our results can be
attributed to the fact that when a user’s location cluster is
split into smaller clusters (i.e. first-level clusters), our heuristics
cannot entirely capture the true behavior of that location, which
further signifies the importance of our second-level clustering.
As aforementioned, other locations frequented by users during
or near working hours can exhibit work-like characteristics
(e.g., gym, coffee shopts etc.) affecting fine-grained approaches
like ours when working with sporadic location datasets. Our
second-level clustering allows our system to group data points
that belong to the same location but have been assigned to
nearby locations due to the displacement introduced by user
mobility (e.g., tweeting while leaving work) or GPS errors.
In a sense, this can be seen as enhancing the “signal”, thus
allowing our system to better capture the user’s behavior in
each location. After applying our second-level clustering, our
techniques improve significantly by 18.5% and 23.6% for the
Home-Top and Home-Low datasets and by 22.8% and 27.2%
for the Work-Top and Work-Low datasets respectively.
B. Inference of Sensitive Places
LPAuditor detected 6,483 potentially sensitive clusters
(PSCs) across our ground truth. Specifically, it identified 938
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Fig. 9: Potentially sensitive clusters, i.e., in close proximity to
venues belonging to a sensitive category.
(93.42%) Home-Top users with a total of 5,393 PSCs, and
516 (49.47%) users in Home-Low with 1,090 PSCs. This
difference between datasets is expected as users in the latter
have fewer geotagged tweets and considerably less clusters.
Figure 9 breaks down the detected PSCs according to the
category of the associated venues. For PSCs that have more
than one sensitive venue in close proximity, we first assign that
PSC to the category of the closest venue. We also present how
the distribution changes if each PSC is mapped to all sensitive
venues in proximity (denoted as “Multiple attribution”). When
only considering the sensitive venue with the shortest distance
to the PSC’s coordinates, we identify 5,094 health-related
clusters, and 918 and 471 venues related to religion and
sex/nightlife respectively. Interestingly, if we intersect these
clusters with users’ ground truth work locations we find 10
common instances in the Work-Low and 15 in the Work-Top
sets; out of those only 3 from the latter set were identified by
our system through tf-idf. As such, we believe that the vast
majority of cases are users visiting these sensitive venues, as
opposed to working there.
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Content-based corroboration. When using tf-idf and
our wordlists, we increase our confidence in placing users
at 545 of the detected PSCs. To assess these results we
identified the clusters that contain at least one keyword from
the respective wordlists and manually inspected the clusters’
tweets, to assert whether the user was actually referring to
a sensitive place. This manual inspection showed that our
approach had an overall precision of 80.36% and a 93.79%
recall, as presented in Table IV. Out of the 438 verified
sensitive venues, 375 were related to health, 51 and 12 to
religion and sex respectively. We observed a small number of
false positives due to ambiguous keywords that remained in
our wordlists (e.g., “shot”); however, we kept these terms as
the true positives significantly outweighed the false positives.
On the other hand, in some cases our approach missed certain
sensitive clusters due to users that post sensitive content repeat-
edly from many clusters (e.g., a religious user that tweeted
religious content from multiple locations), which resulted in
these keywords not being deemed significant by tf-idf.
Furthermore, it is important to stress that we obtain a lower
bound on the number of sensitive venues that a user has visited,
as the user may simply post tweets that do not contain the
appropriate context.
Depending on the attacker’s end goal, there might not be
a need for absolute certainty of whether the user visited the
sensitive place. Even low confidence levels may be considered
a sufficient indicator; for instance, an insurance company
looking at a user’s social media profile to decide on adjusting
the user’s premium or purchasing their policy [4]. Nonetheless,
as an extra source of ground truth, we identified these users’
tweets that were generated by the Foursquare app and followed
the typical format of a check-in; we then compared the venues
of these check-ins to the clusters of sensitive nearby venues.
This allowed us to verify certain detected sensitive places
irrespective of the content posted from these clusters. This
returned 105 sensitive clusters for our ground truth users,
20 of which were also detected by tf-idf. While this
source of ground truth is considerably small, it offers an
interesting indication of user behavior; users are extremely
reserved when it comes to explicitly publishing that they are at
a sensitive location. This further exemplifies the implications of
the location metadata being exposed, as it directly undermines
privacy-conscious user behavior.
To further investigate the tweeting behavior of users from
sensitive venues, we used LPAuditor to infer sensitive places
visited by the remaining users from the Top-6K and Low-
10K datasets. Our system identified 21,863 PSCs for 4,418
users from the Top-6K dataset and through content-based
corroboration identified 1,512 of them as sensitive clusters
that have been visited. Of those, 1,282 are health related, 196
pertain to religion and 34 are related to sex. Similarly for the
users from the Low-10K dataset, we identified 6,918 PSCs,
with 474 being flagged by our system, with 341 related to
health, 115 to religion, and 18 to sex.
Duration-based corroboration. When using the duration-
based approach (DB), as can be seen in Table V, we identified
691 users from the Home-Top and 205 from the Home-Low
dataset that have repeatedly visited or spent a considerable
amount of time at 1,699 and 276 PSCs respectively. Similarly,
in the Top-6K and Low-10K datasets, we identified 3,012 and
TABLE IV: Results of content-based (CB) identification of
users visiting sensitive places, for our ground truth.
Home-Top Home-Low Total
Users in Dataset 1,004 1,043 2,047
PSCs 5,393 1,090 6,483
Users w/ PSCs 938 516 1,454
Guessed Clusters (CB) 464 81 545
Users w/ CB Clusters 328 72 400
True Positive (TP) 368 70 438
False Positive (FP) 96 11 107
False Negative (FN) 25 4 29
Precision (TP/TP+FP) 79.31% 86.41% 80.36%
Recall (TP/TP+FN) 93.63% 94.59% 93.79%
F-Score 85.87% 90.31% 86.55%
TABLE V: Results of duration-based (DB) identification of
users visiting sensitive places, for all datasets.
Home-Top Home-Low Top-6K Low-10K
Visited Clusters (DB) 1,699 276 7,020 2,337
• Medical 1,307 194 5,193 1,626
• Religion 245 56 1,176 493
• Sex/nightlife 147 26 651 218
Users w/ DB Clusters 691 205 3,012 1,672
Common CB/DB Clusters 53.44% 44.44% 53.9% 47.25%
Users w/ CB/DB Clusters 86.89% 59.72% 86.26% 65.88%
1,672 users that have visited 7,020 and 2,337 such places. It
should be noted though that these numbers constitute a lower-
bound estimation, as the duration-based approach does not take
into consideration PSCs that only contain a single tweet.
Interestingly, we observe that 53.44% and 53.9% of the
sensitive clusters detected by the content-based approach (i.e.,
CB clusters) for the Home-Top and Top-6K datasets respec-
tively, are among the visited clusters returned by the duration-
based approach (DB clusters). For the Home-Low and Low-
10K datasets, 44.44% and 47.25% of the clusters detected
with the content-based approach have been also detected by
the duration-based approach. Employing both approaches can
increase confidence in identifying sensitive places the users
have visited. Thus, for scenarios requiring higher levels of
confidence, an attacker can select the intersection of the sets
returned by the two approaches. Another noteworthy observa-
tion is that the DB approach results in a higher ratio of sex-
related clusters compared to CB, which indicates that users
are reluctant to explicitly mention such venues while further
highlighting the risk of geotagged tweets.
Contextual privacy loss. A significant implication of this
inference is that location metadata can amplify the loss of pri-
vacy by revealing sensitive details or additional context about
the tweet’s content that might not match the user’s intended
level of disclosure. While we found this to be common across
most cases of sensitive clusters we identified, it is not our
goal to quantify or exhaustively enumerate this phenomenon.
Instead, we anecdotally refer to a few representative examples
that highlight this dimension of privacy leakage. In one case,
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Fig. 10: Granularity of location for all geotagged tweets
between 2014-2016 in our entire dataset.
TABLE VI: Tweets with GPS coordinates depending on Twit-
ter’s policy on including precise location metadata.
Dataset Before 4/2015 After 4/2015
All tweets 24.98% 1.35%
Coarse-grained tweets 99.9% 2.85%
the user expressed negative feelings about his/her doctor, while
the GPS coordinates place the user in the office of a mental
health professional. In another example, the user complained
about some blood tests, while being geo-located at a rehab
center. Also, geotagged religion-based tweets can reveal the
type of that place of worship (e.g., mosque, synagogue) and
may even point to a specific denomination. However, even if
users are cautious and nothing sensitive is disclosed in the
tweets, the location information obtainable with our duration-
based approach can result in significant privacy loss.
C. Impact of Historical Data
During our analysis we found that Twitter app versions
released prior to April 2015 automatically include GPS coor-
dinates in tweets tagged with a coarse location. The resulting
tweets have both a coarse-grained label (e.g., city) and GPS
coordinates in their metadata. Furthermore, that information
is not visible in the app or the web version. Thus, users are
completely oblivious to the public availability of this sensitive
information. In newer versions users have to explicitly opt to
include GPS information on a per-tweet basis. The apps with a
more privacy-respecting behavior were released on April 15th
for iOS and the 20th for Android. Nonetheless, the historical
metadata collected from the prior versions remains publicly
accessible through Twitter’s API.
Unavoidable privacy leakage. As shown in Figure 10
user behavior changes after April 2015, with far fewer tweets
with precise location, and users tagging tweets with the newly
introduced point-of-interest (POI) that denotes locations of
varying granularity. However, throughout the entire lifespan
of our dataset, users keep posting tweets tagged with a coarse-
grained location, further indicating that they are interested in
enriching the context of their tweets, but not always willing
to disclose their exact whereabouts. Table VI shows that there
is significant change, with a 35-fold reduction in the ratio of
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Fig. 11: Days passed since the most recent tweet.
tweets that contain GPS coordinates after the release dates of
the apps with the privacy-respecting approach. Since we do
not have the ability to detect each user’s app version, we first
separate the data on the official release date for each platform
(i.e., we take into account if the user is on Android or iOS).
While some users may have delayed updating their app, that
would only increase the ratio of tweets with GPS; thus, the
actual reduction of tweets with GPS is even higher, further
highlighting the unavoidable privacy violation that users faced
due to Twitter’s poor handling of location data. While we
expected that all coarse-grained tweets from before 04/2015
would contain GPS coordinates, we found that ∼0.1% do not.
These were all from before 08/2010 indicating the point in
time when Twitter started the practice of appending GPS data
to coarse-grained tweets. Consequently this privacy-invasive
policy persisted for almost 5 years until Twitter gave users
greater control over the location information they exposed.
Nonetheless, users with older devices or versions of the app are
still exposing this type of data, while all users’ data remains
accessible online.
Historical data. We explored the impact of Twitter main-
taining and publicly sharing historical location metadata, by
calculating how many users would remain vulnerable if GPS
coordinates were not included in coarse-grained tweets. In
Figure 11 we first look at the number of days that have passed
since the last tweet from a home/work location. We find that
56.57% and 68.45% of the users posted their last tweet from
home right before the release of the newer app version, a large
percentage around the dates of the app release, and only a small
number after that. As we do not have information regarding the
date each user installed the newer app version on their device,
we cannot know the exact numbers. However, it is evident
that the majority of users stopped posting tweets with precise
location information from their home and work locations.
To further investigate how users’ behavior changed since
Twitter changed its policy, we identified the users that have
posted tweets with coordinates after the app release date (and
the following weeks) and ran LPAuditor only on the tweets
posted after those dates. As can be seen in Table VII, as users
started updating their apps, the number of users posting tweets
with precise location drops rapidly. Indicatively, only 15.43%
and 11.12% of the users in the two datasets continued posting
such tweets four weeks after the release of the new app. When
using only tweets posted at least four weeks after the app
release we were able to correctly identify the home of 7.34%
and 6.39% of the users that are identified when all data is used.
Regarding the “freshness” of historical data, it is important
to note that even if some of the users’ key locations have
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TABLE VII: Home inference using geotagged tweets posted
after the new geolocation policy of Twitter.
Dataset Date Users Homes Coverage
Home-Top Release 602 333 35.96%
Home-Top +4 Weeks 155 68 7.34%
Home-Low Release 394 239 24.66%
Home-Low +4 Weeks 116 62 6.39%
changed (e.g., a user has since moved to a different home),
users can still be identified by that data, and the inferred
sensitive information does not “expire”. The sensitive user
traits, actions or beliefs that can be inferred by the three
categories that we explore will still characterize the users
regardless of the current location of their home or workplace.
Even for ephemeral characteristics that no longer hold true,
exposure of that sensitive information can still affect users
(e.g., certain cured medical issues remain social taboos). As
such, given the adage that “the Web never forgets”, Twitter’s
invasive privacy policy cannot be dismissed as a case of a
vulnerability that has been fixed. As long as this historical
data persists online, users will continue to face the significant
privacy risks that we have highlighted in this paper.
D. Performance evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our system we selected
1000 users randomly from all the users with geotagged tweets
and measured the time required by each module of LPAuditor,
as well as the total time, for completing the entire process.
As expected, this time depends on the number of tweets and
clusters each user has; as such we randomly chose the users to
reflect a representative distribution. As shown in Figure 12, the
most time demanding operations are those of collecting a user’s
tweets, collecting PSCs, and the first-level clustering all of
which rely on the use of third-party APIs (i.e., communication
over the network, rate limits, etc.). On the other hand, the time
required for the other steps are in the order of milliseconds,
which can be considered as negligible.
Using a commodity desktop, LPAuditor requires less that
12 seconds for collecting all the tweets of roughly half the
users, and less than 20 seconds for around 98% of the users.
Furthermore, for the collection of PSCs it takes up to six
seconds for half of the users, and more than 29 and 66 seconds
for 15% and 5% of the users respectively. For the process of
clustering, our system takes up to 35 seconds for about 50%
of the users, and more than 164 and 305 seconds for 15% and
5% of the users. To that end, when considering the total time
spent, LPAuditor takes less than 52 seconds for half of the
users, and more than 207 and 385 for 15% and 5% of them
(users with a very large number of tweets and clusters). Our
system can complete the whole process in less than a minute
for half the users, while approximately 95% of them can be
processed within six minutes. This highlights the severity and
scale of the privacy threat we have explored, as adversaries
could trivially run such attacks for a massive number of users.
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VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Twitter privacy leakage mitigation. The pitfalls of
location-sharing have long troubled researchers. And while
our work demonstrates the extent of the risks users face,
it also highlights an important aspect of the issue that, to
our knowledge, has not been explored before. While previous
work has mainly focused on users knowingly or inadvertently
sharing location data in social platforms, we also identified
an inconspicuous form of privacy leakage that is invisible
to users. Even though Twitter has since opted for a more
privacy-oriented policy where users have to explicitly choose
to append GPS coordinates in tweets, the availability of
historical metadata severely undermines the benefits of this
more recent approach. Apart from the fact that after users are
given the choice they are 18.5 times less likely to include GPS
coordinates,∼93% of the users identified by LPAuditor are due
to the historical tweets geotagged by Twitter. These findings
underline the risks of web services publicly over-sharing data
through their APIs, which poses an alarming flip side to the
common problematic behavior of over-collecting data [65].
We found that Twitter mentions this behavior [74], and de-
scribes the process for removing location data [73]. However,
they explicitly warn users that “deleting location information
on Twitter does not guarantee the information will be removed
from all copies of the data on third-party applications or in
external search results”. As data brokers continuously collect
and sell Twitter data, even if users do remove all location
metadata from their tweets, it is not necessary that those
changes will be reflected in the versions maintained by others.
As users continue to tweet the privacy threats posed by
historical data may naturally degrade through time, as less and
less of those geotagged tweets will be obtainable through the
free public API (which sets a limit for the 3200 most recent
tweets). Interestingly this degradation will occur faster for
more prolific users. However, it is important to note that third-
party copies of that data will still exist, while more resourceful
or motivated attackers will still be able to utilize Twitter’s paid
APIs that give access to a complete archive of users’ tweets.
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Ideally, our study will motivate services and act as a
deterrent against publishing sensitive metadata not explicitly
broadcast by users (interestingly, a recent study explored how
other types of metadata can uniquely identify a user [55]).
While the availability of public Twitter data has facilitated
innovative and impactful research, the privacy threats that users
face remains an important issue. This is further exacerbated
by the significant ramifications for users that rely on the
pseudonymous nature of Twitter [50]. Overall, while Twitter
offers a partial solution for mitigating the privacy risks of this
(historical) data, there exists no foolproof course of action for
completely eradicating this threat.
Applicability of LPAuditor. The techniques used by our
system for inferring users’ home and work locations are not
tied to Twitter, but can be readily applied to any (sparse)
location dataset that contains periodic entries of GPS coordi-
nates and timestamps. For datasets that contain very frequent
snapshots of a user’s location (e.g., continuously collected
every couple of seconds), a simple form of sampling should
be sufficient for reducing the computational overhead that
can arise from a massive number of data points. And while
our content-based technique for inferring sensitive locations
is not applicable to every location-based service as it relies
on the tweets’ content, our duration-based technique can also
be applied to any location dataset. However, it is important
to stress that our evaluation focuses solely on Twitter and the
exact effectiveness of our techniques on other data sources
remains unexplored.
LPAuditor adoption. Recent headlines regarding third
parties harvesting personal user information in services like
Facebook [7] have reignited the public discourse over user
privacy and data protection. Facebook has announced plans
for offering users more control over their data [3] and Twitter
is aiming for increased transparency due to the new GDPR
requirements [6]. As such, it is evident that there is need
for tools and techniques that can intuitively inform users
about what data of theirs is exposed. And while certain cases
of data exposure can be self-evident, sensitive information
inference may be less obvious. To that end, LPAuditor can be
incorporated by any location-based service or social network
for clearly notifying users of such exposure. For services that
do not obfuscate locations, users can also explore user-side
location-obfuscation tools like LP-Doctor [24] or an app for
location spoofing [59].
POI. While we find a massive reduction in tweets with GPS
coordinates after the release of the less privacy-invasive Twitter
apps, there is a considerable number of tweets with a “point of
interest” label. These labels cover areas from very coarse (e.g.,
“Central Park”) to fine-grained (e.g., “Starbucks”). However,
without the GPS coordinates it becomes much harder to place
users at those locations, since the tweet may be about that
place instead of at that place [75]. We consider the exploration
of POI-based privacy leakage as future work.
Ethical considerations and disclosure. As is the case with
any study that explores user privacy, it is important to address
the ethical implications of our work. A precise description
of our study and experimental protocol were submitted to
and approved for exemption by our university’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB). Moreover, apart from only collecting
publicly available data offered by the official Twitter API,
all usernames were removed during the manual annotation
process. This ensured that the authors would not be able to
identify/deanonymize any users. At the same time, all collected
data and results from our analysis were stored on machines
with up-to-date software, encrypted hard drives, where access
was strictly limited to the authors and only possible from
two white-listed internal IP addresses using authorized SSH
keys. We believe that our research presents minimal risk
while having the potential for significant benefits to users; we
have submitted a report to Twitter outlining our research and
findings, and substantiating the need to purge this historical
data. Moreover, we have deleted all the results of our analysis,
as well as the ground truth dataset and the entirety of the
collected Twitter data, to eliminate any potential of future
privacy risks to the users.
By reporting the accuracy of our location identification
techniques we can alert users of the true extent of the privacy
threats they face. Also, by educating users on the risks of
location sharing we hope to motivate even more privacy-
conscious behavior. Finally, demonstrating the practicality and
feasibility of impactful attacks can incentivize services to
incorporate privacy-preserving techniques for collecting and
sharing location data (e.g., [32], [9], [24]) and offer the
functionality of LPAuditor as an intuitive auditing tool for
users to assess their level of privacy exposure.
VII. RELATED WORK
Prior work has proposed approaches for identifying home
and work locations that range from inspecting social graphs,
to studying check-ins and precise geolocation data (a survey
can be found in [82]). As certain users do not geotag their
tweets, previous work has also tried to infer home locations
based on tweet content [15], [49], [67] or other information
like social ties [33], [14] or check-in behavior [43]. However,
these studies can only infer key locations with a very coarse
granularity. Furthermore, the inference of sensitive information
from other location data points has not been explored.
Location inference. In a study that investigated mobil-
ity patterns, Cho et al. [17] considered geographic cells of
625km2, and considered a home location to be the average
position of the cell with the most check-ins. Pontes et al. [60]
used Foursquare check-ins and correctly inferred the home city
of ∼78% of users. By considering that users are located at their
home at night and near their office during working hours, Liu
et al. [47] identified the key locations of 68% of the users
within a distance of 2.5 km. Efstathiades et al. [22] followed
an approach similar to Liu et al.’s for detecting users’ home
and work at a postcode granularity
using three Twitter datasets from the Netherlands, London,
and the Los Angeles county. Given that the average size of
a postal code area in LA is approximately 14.66km2 and
includes over 37K residents (our calculations are based on data
from [18]), it is evident that postcode-level granularity is still
very coarse.
Furthermore, the work by Isaacman et al. [39] leveraged
cellular network data to identify important user locations,
based on different factors such as the number of days a cluster
of cell towers was contacted, and the duration and number of
such events, during home hours (7pm-7am) and work hours
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(1pm-5pm on weekdays) i.e., the number of times a cell tower
was contacted in the corresponding set of hours. Then, by
employing logistic regression and setting several thresholds
derived from 18 training volunteers, the authors estimated the
likelihood of a cluster being important. Out of these clusters,
again relying on logistic regression, they would pick as home
the cluster deemed most significant by the home hour events
factor (i.e. the one with the largest number of events during
the home hours), and as work the cluster with a high work
hour and a low home hour score. In a similar setting, [34]
and [40] relied on GSM and WiFi transmission beacons to
identify significant user locations, but these two works did
not attempt to label the identified locations as home or work.
However, in reality, approaches that rely on that type of data
(i.e., cellular data) are limited in terms of granularity that can
be achieved. Indicatively, the authors of [39] estimated that
the median distance error for their home and work inference
approach is around 1.44Km and 1.33Km. This is expected
though, considering that the distance between the actual home
and work locations (reported by the study’s participants) and
their nearest cell towers are 0.98Km and 0.8Km for home and
work, respectively.
While our approach for detecting home and work locations
is based on spatiotemporal analysis, similarly to the previous
work in the area, we are the first to propose an approach that
considers the vertical “widespreadness” of users’ activity for
detecting the home location, as well as a dynamic and adaptive
approach for detecting the user’s work location after estimating
working hours (night shifts etc.).
Apart from LPAuditor outperforming previously proposed
techniques (as shown in Section V), our experimental evalua-
tion and comparative study was conducted on a ground truth
dataset that is significantly more complete and fine-grained
than the datasets used in prior studies. In detail, the ground
truth constructed in [22] was at a postcode level, while Cheng
et. al [16] did not actually verify their home selection with
some form of ground truth. Similarly, in [17] the authors
constructed a ground truth using 25x25km cells and stated
that “manual inspection shows that this infers home locations
with 85% accuracy” but did not include more details on how
that was done. Furthermore, the datasets in [42], [35], [46]
all contained only home locations, with the dataset by Lin
et al. [46] being based solely on the visual inspection of the
GPS data points. While in [35] the authors also relied on
manual inspection of tweet content for identifying the home
locations, that process was conducted by Amazon Mechanical
Turk workers who were only shown a subset of five tweets
from a cluster, whereas our manual inspection was conducted
collectively on the entirety of tweets assigned to each cluster.
Location and de-anonymization. The problem of identify-
ing key locations has also been explored in different settings,
e.g., using continuous GPS data collected from receivers in
cars [42] or wearables [44]. Golle and Partridge built upon
these findings and explored how users can be identified from
different granularities of anonymized census data [29]. De
Montjoye et al. [21] explored the uniqueness of user mobility
patterns in a 15-month dataset for 1.5M people, and found
that four coarse-grained spatiotemporal points can uniquely
differentiate 95% of the individuals within the set. Previously,
Chong et al. [71] reported a 93% predictability in mobility
by measuring the entropy of users’ trajectories. Rossi et
al. [66] demonstrated the feasibility of identifying users within
mobility traces by using movement data including speed,
direction and distance of travel and found that as little as two
location points may be sufficient to uniquely identify users.
Zang et al. [80] leveraged an anonymized three-month dataset
of mobile call records, consisting of roughly 25M users, and
discovered that as few as the top-2 most frequented locations
can re-identify a user, even in varying granularities, such as
call sector, cell, zip code level etc.
User behavior. Prior work also explored how users interact
with or disclose location data, and the feasibility of social-tie
inference. Liccardi et al. [45] explored how different ways
of visualizing data affected users in inferring the type of a
location (home, work, etc). Ahern et al. [8] investigated how
users select the privacy settings for uploaded photos, and found
that users are more likely to set as private photos that are
taken at frequently photographed locations while tending to
set photos from less frequented locations public. Consolvo
et al. [19] found that users were willing to disclose exact
locations, but that study focused on a different setting where
users were asked about sharing information with friends,
family and colleagues. Tang et al. [72] identified how users
adapt their location sharing behavior and explored the different
ways and levels of granularity at which users decide to share
their location under different hypothetical scenarios. Cheng et
al. [16] conducted a large-scale study of location data and
studied mobility patterns and the correlation between check-
ins and message content and sentiment. Sadilek et al. [68]
proposed a probabilistic human mobility model for predicting
users’ social links and locations. That model considers users
who disclose GPS coordinates as noisy sensors for inferring
the location of their friends. Several other works (e.g., [20],
[56], [69], [81]) leverage spatiotemporal data for inferring
social ties among users. More recently, Backes et al. [12]
developed an attack for inferring social relationships from
mobility data, which constructs and compares user mobility
profiles in an unsupervised setting. Working on the opposite
perspective, Aronov et al. [11] leverage relationships and
additional information such as co-location of events to infer
other potentially visited locations.
Aggregate Location Data. Prior work has also studied
how aggregate location time-series can lead to significant
privacy loss. Pyrgelis et al. [63] presented a novel methodology
to study membership inference on such data, by formalizing
the problem as a distinguishability game, and showed that such
attacks are indeed feasible and can lead to significant privacy
loss depending on different factors, such as the adversary’s
prior knowledge, aggregation group sizes etc. Shokri et al. [70]
investigated membership machine learning based membership
inference, and used a dataset of Foursquare check-ins to eval-
uate their attack. In another work, Pyrgelis et al. [62] studied
how aggregate location data can be leveraged to localize
and even profile individual users, under different adversarial
knowledge scenarios. Finally, Xu et al. [78], demonstrated
that it is possible to recover individual user trajectories from
aggregate location data with high accuracy, based on the key
assumptions that users’ daily trajectories tend to be regular but
also differ significantly among users. They also highlight that
due to the high uniqueness of the recovered trajectories further
attacks, such re-identification, are enabled.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the privacy threats that arise from pre-
cise location (meta)data being publicly accessible in Twitter’s
API. By developing novel techniques for identifying a user’s
exact home and work location, and inferring sensitive infor-
mation through the reconstruction of a user’s location history,
LPAuditor highlights the true extent of the risk of exposing
such information. To make matters worse, our experimental
evaluation revealed how Twitter’s invasive policy of including
precise location data in previous app versions has significant
implications, as it results in an almost 15-fold increase in the
number of users whose key locations are successfully identified
by our system. Given that users are most likely oblivious
to this privacy leakage, it is important to shed light on this
privacy-invasive practice. We hope that our work will serve as
a cautionary tale, equipping users with the means to manage
their personal data and avoid the risks of public exposure.
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